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Abstract
This paper reviews the empirical literature on the impact of company taxes
on the allocation of foreign direct investment. We make the outcomes of 25
empirical studies comparable by computing the tax rate elasticity under a
uniform definition. The mean value of the tax rate elasticity in the literature is
around -3.3, i.e. a 1%-point reduction in the host-country tax rate raises
foreign direct investment in that country by 3.3%. There exists substantial
variation across studies, however. By performing a meta analysis, the paper
aims to explain this variation by the differences in characteristics of the
underlying studies. Systematic differences between studies are found with
respect to the type of foreign capital data used, and the type of tax rates
adopted. We find no systematic differences in the responsiveness of
investors from tax credit countries and tax exemption countries.
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During the last decade, European countries have reduced company tax rates. Indeed, whereas
the mean corporate income tax rate in the EU was 38% in 1990, it dropped to 33% in 2000
(Gorter en De Mooij, 2001). Although the average tax burden on companies has been rather
stable during this period, some EU governments have recently launched proposals to also
reduce it. To illustrate, Germany, Ireland and Portugal have recently reduced their taxes while
the Netherlands, Italy and France are discussing proposals for tax reform and relief. These
proposals are motivated by the growing internationalisation of businesses and the increasing
mobility of capital. Indeed, by reducing tax rates, European countries aim to improve their
investment climate for foreign companies.
Some people fear that these national tax reforms in Europe will end up in a degradation of
tax systems and that they will threaten its redistributive function. Especially since the code of
conduct on business taxation in the EU prohibits the use of tailor-made tax measures to attract
foreign businesses, countries may compete more and more on the basis of the overall tax
burden. Such tax competition may yield a suboptimal outcome for Europe. Indeed, cooperation
may be beneficial and perhaps even Pareto improving for European countries. It has therefore
been suggested to harmonise capital income tax rates in Europe.
Discussions about company tax reform and tax harmonisation rely heavily on the belief that
tax rates have important implications for the behaviour of multinational firms. The economic
literature tends to support this claim (for an overview see Hines, 1997). First, differences in
statutory tax rates between countries provoke profit shifting through debt contracts,
manipulation of transfer prices, and so on. Second, taxes affect the amount of dividend
repatriations of subsidiaries to their parent companies. And finally, company taxes determine
the allocation of real investments of multinational companies. This latter effect seems to attract
most attention in debates on tax reform and tax harmonisation. The reason is perhaps that,
compared to financial operations such as profit shifting and dividend repatriations, real
investment behaviour is more important from a welfare-economic perspective.
Since the mid 1980's, numerous papers have analysed how foreign direct investment (FDI)
or new plant decisions are affected by company taxes. A summary of the early literature is
provided by the Ruding report (see CEC, 1992), which primarily refers to US studies. The report
concludes that company taxes have a significant negative impact on the inflow of foreign
investment. Hines (1997; 1999) reviews more recent US literature. He suggests a consensus
estimate on the basis of the literature between  0.5 and 0.6, i.e. a 1% higher tax rate on
companies leads to a reduction in FDI by 0.5% to 0.6%. A recent literature review by Gorter and
De Mooij (2001) also includes studies for Europe which rely on FDI data. They suggest that
intra-European investment flows tend to be more responsive to tax rate differentials than do
continental flows. 
1 Annex 5A of the Ruding report does a similar exercise, but they had only three studies available at that time.
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These literature surveys are helpful to get an impression of the empirical literature.
However, they also have some limitations. First of all, the underlying studies are difficult to
compare because of different specifications, different data and different methodologies. This is
especially so because there is no commonly agreed theory of FDI that yields a preferred
specification. Therefore, studies use different ad-hoc specifications to estimate the elasticity.
Second, the underlying studies report different types of elasticities. This makes a direct
comparison virtually impossible. Finally, although it is tempting to draw firm conclusions from
a survey, this could be misleading. As Jeffrey Frankel (1997) asks in a comment to Hines
review: Is there any selection going on here, whether by the authors in reporting their results,
the journals in publishing them or Hines in choosing to include them in his survey? (Frankel,
1997, pp. 448). More generally, ordinary surveys are typically subjective characterisations of the
literature, sometimes accompanied by some type of vote counting in which the number of
positive, negative, and insignificant elasticities are computed. This approach may well yield
misleading conclusions, as is illustrated by the theory of meta analysis (see e.g. Cooper and
Hedges, 1994).
These qualifications form the motivation for this paper. In particular, in addition to
reviewing the empirical literature, this paper contains two main contributions. First, we make
an attempt to translate the findings of 25 empirical studies into comparable elasticities.
1 Second,
we correlate these elasticities to the characteristics of the underlying studies. This meta approach
is interesting for at least three reasons. 
First, compared to an ordinary survey, an advantage of meta analysis is that it makes the
selection process explicit and verifiable. In fact, each literature survey is characterized by a
selection process. Selection is justified to the extent that the quality of studies differs, but it is
also unavoidable to the extent that it originates from publication bias. In many surveys the
selection process remains implicit.
A second contribution of the meta analysis is that it yields useful information for future
research. For instance, we explore whether there are systematic differences between studies that
(i) use different types of effective tax rates on capital income; (ii) use different types of foreign
capital data; (iii) use different control variables; (iv) use different specifications or estimation
procedures, etc. These issues have been addressed in the underlying studies. Our study
investigates in a different way how important they are. In a sense, the meta analysis is used to
rethink the current state of the art in the literature, and to explore fruitful directions for future
research. In this respect, meta analysis is more rigorous than an ordinary survey of the literature
because of the multivariate character of the analysis. For instance, as this paper reveals, simple
pairwise comparisons of study characteristics and effect size can yield misleading conclusions. 
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A third contribution of the meta analysis is that it yields interesting insights for policy
makers. For instance, we are able to explore whether tax elasticities are systematically influenced
by (i) the sample period of the underlying data; (ii) the source of finance of foreign investments;
(iii) whether the investor is located in a tax exemption country or a tax credit country, and so on. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We start in section 2 with a discussion of the
relationship between taxes and foreign direct investment. Section 3 gives a review of the
empirical literature and provides a summary table with the main characteristics of the 25 studies
that form our meta sample. Section 4 presents the meta analysis, starting with a simple analysis
of variation, followed by a number of regressions. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Taxes and foreign direct investment: theory and data issues
2.1 Foreign direct investment
In statistical information on foreign capital flows, a usual distinction is between foreign
portfolio investment (FPI) and foreign direct investment (FDI). FPI is defined as foreign
investments in cases where the investor controls less than some fixed proportion of the capital
stock that is invested in. The IMF guidelines propose a proportion of 10%. FPI generally refers
to household investment in foreign securities, often channelled through financial intermediaries
such as mutual funds or pension funds.
Foreign direct investment is, according to the IMF guidelines, defined as foreign
investments in which the investor owns more than 10% of the stock that is invested in. This
generally refers to investments by multinationals in foreign controlled corporations such as
affiliates or subsidiaries. FDI flows consist of two broad categories: (i) direct net transfers from
the parent company to a foreign affiliate, either through equity or debt, and (ii) reinvested
earnings by a foreign affiliate. Other ways to finance the investments of subsidiaries, such as
local borrowing or local issuance of shares, are not registered as FDI. In that sense, FDI may
underestimate the total investment of corporations that are controlled by foreign parent
companies.
Compared to FPI, FDI is generally thought to be more closely related to the allocation of real
capital, the main interest in our analysis. Still, statistical information on FDI involves financial
flows that do not necessarily correspond to the allocation of real investment. Indeed, FDI
comprises several types of capital. First, it contains real investment in plant and equipment (PE),
either in the form of new plant and equipment or plant expansions. Second, a major part of FDI
consists of the financial flows associated with mergers and acquisitions. This implies a change
in ownership without any real investment taking place. Estimates by the OECD suggest that
mergers and acquisitions account for more than 60% of all FDI in developed countries (OECD,
2000). Other components of FDI are joint ventures and equity increases. The latter component 
2 Business surveys usually find that taxes are important for corporate managers in making locational decisions,
although usually not the most important one, see e.g. the Ruding report.
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typically comprises investment in financial capital. The distinction between the different types of
FDI is important because the different components may respond differently to taxes (Auerbach
and Hassett, 1993).
Decisions by multinationals to undertake FDI are usually complex since they involve
strategic decisions. The most widely accepted theory of FDI is probably the eclectic approach
developed by Dunning (1981). For a multinational that seeks to maximize the value of the firm,
FDI is attractive if the so-called OLI conditions are met, referring to Ownership, Location and
Internalisation. First, there must be an ownership advantage for the multinational relative to
ownership by local firms. This may have something to do with specific technological or
organisational knowledge of the multinational, but could also relate to tax issues. Second, it
must be attractive for the multinational to produce abroad because of some comparative
locational advantage. Otherwise, the multinational would have chosen to export, rather than to
invest. Finally, it should be attractive to undertake activities within the multinational, rather than
buying or leasing them from other firms. 
Taxes can affect all three OLI conditions. For instance, it can affect the tax treatment of a
foreign firm, relative to domestically owned firms. The tax rate can also be a factor that
determines the attractiveness of a location for undertaking investments. Note, however, that
taxes are one of many potential locational factors. Other factors include a good infrastructure,
the availability of workers with good knowledge, proximity to markets, or the proximity of other
businesses due to network and agglomeration benefits.
2
As noted above, FDI data can be problematic to the extent that its different components
respond differently to taxes. In particular, only a fraction of FDI refers to the allocation of real
capital in plant and equipment while, at the same time, other investments by foreign controlled
companies are not registered as FDI. Therefore, it is difficult to infer the appropriate elasticity of
real foreign capital from regressions that use the aggregate FDI data. To deal with this problem,
a number of US studies have used information on investment in property, plant and equipment
(PPE), which is thought to be a better approximation of investment in real capital. Others have
focussed on the number of foreign locations, rather than the amount of capital. This variation in
the use of data is important for our analysis since it allows us to explore how particular data
affect the magnitude of elasticities.
2.2 Taxation of foreign direct investment
The return to foreign direct investment may be subject to international double taxation. In
particular, a foreign subsidiary is always subject to corporate income tax in the host country. 
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These profits of the subsidiary can be taxed again under the corporate income tax in the home
country of the parent. As this international double taxation would strongly discourage
international business activity, most countries avoid it by means of bilateral tax treaties based on
the OECD Model Tax Convention. In the EU, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive ensures that
countries either adopt a credit system or an exemption system to avoid international double
taxation within the Union. The US and Japan adopt tax credit systems. In the EU, this holds for
Greece, Italy and the UK. All other EU countries adopt the tax exemption system.
Under the exemption system (or territorial taxation), foreign income that is taxed in the host
country is exempt from taxation in the home country of the parent. Hence, profits are only taxed
in the country where the subsidiary is located. To illustrate, a Dutch firm that invests in a
German subsidiary is subject to the German corporate income tax alone. Dividend payments to
the Dutch parent company thus remain untaxed in the Netherlands. Countries that adopt the
exemption system differ with respect to their application of these exemptions. In some
countries, firms can claim tax exemptions only if they control a substantial share of a company
and when a minimum of foreign corporate income tax is paid. Other countries impose less tight
conditions on the ownership share or on the foreign tax paid.
Under a credit system (or worldwide taxation), tax liabilities in the host country of the
subsidiary are credited against taxes in the home country of the parent. For instance, the
corporate income tax in Greece is 40% while Denmark adopts a rate of 32%. As Greece adopts
the credit system, a Greek corporation that earns 100 euro in Denmark pays 32 euro corporate
income tax in Denmark and an additional 8 euro in Greece. Would Greece have adopted the
exemption system, the corporation would have been subject to the Danish corporate income tax
alone. Governments generally limit the foreign tax credits that firms can claim. Indeed, if
foreign tax payments exceed the tax liability in the home country of the parent company, there
exists an excess foreign tax credit. In that case, firms are usually permitted to claim no more tax
credit than the domestic tax liability, i.e. it is in effect exempt from taxation. If the tax liability in
the home country of the parent exceeds the foreign tax payment, there is deficit tax credit. Tax
credit countries differ with respect to the application of tax credits, e.g. whether excess foreign
credits can be compensated by deficit tax credits elsewhere or whether compensation is allowed
by carrying backward or forward the deficit foreign credit through time.
Countries that adopt foreign tax credits to avoid international double taxation generally also
permit tax deferral. In particular, profits of foreign affiliates that are reinvested in that company
are deferred until they are repatriated to the parent company through dividend payments. Only
upon the date of repatriation, is the parent company subject to corporate income tax in the
home country. This makes the impact of home country taxation less important for investors
from tax credit countries.
Under credit systems, home and host country taxes exert different incentives for parent
companies to undertake FDI than under exemption systems. Indeed, exempt investors are 
3 Scholes and Wolfson (1990) argue that a higher effective tax on capital in a host country may actually raise the
amount of FDI in that country. The reason is that tax credits shield foreign investors from the higher host-country
tax. Furthermore, the before-tax return to capital may increases in response to the higher tax rate due to general
equilibrium effects. Thus, foreign investors from worldwide countries may benefit from the higher tax rate in the
host country.
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subject to host country tax alone. Hence, home taxes do not matter for the amount of FDI. In
contrast, credit investors will be taxed on a worldwide basis in the home country so that the
home country tax does matter. The impact of the home-country tax is, however, rather subtle
and, for instance, depends on the way in which FDI is financed (transfers and retained earnings)
and whether there is excess foreign tax credit. This study does not focus on the impact of the
home country tax, but rather on the host country tax.
If the parent company is located in a country that adopts the exemption system, a higher tax
rate in the host country makes it a less attractive location because of a lower net return on
investment. Therefore, the probability to locate a plant in that country and the amount of
investment in plant and equipment is likely to be lower. This holds for FDI financed by retained
earnings and equity transfers but not for debt-financed investment since the interest is generally
deductible from corporate profits. For mergers and acquisitions a higher tax in the host country
will probably have minor implications because they affect domestic and foreign owners alike.
In case the parent is located in a country that uses a credit system (in combination with tax
deferral), a higher host-country tax yields more subtle effects on FDI. In particular, if the
multinational finds itself in an excess credit position, the higher tax rate in the host country is
not compensated by a higher domestic credit. Hence, the effect on real investment in plant and
equipment would be the same as under the exemption system. If the multinational is not in an
excess credit position, however, a higher foreign tax rate is compensated by a lower parents tax
liability in the home country. Hence, the higher tax rate in the host country would have no
implications for FDI.
3 The effect on foreign ownership through mergers and acquisitions may
even be positive. This is because, in contrast to local owners, foreign owners are shielded from
the higher host country tax rate by the credit system. Hence, local owners may find it attractive
to sell their stakes to foreign multinationals.
To summarize, a higher tax rate in the host country is likely to reduce FDI from exemption
countries, primarily because it makes the host country less attractive as a location for investment
in plant and equipment. For investors from tax credit countries, however, a higher tax rate in a
host country yields ambiguous effects. On the one hand, it may reduce real investment to the
extent that parents are in an excess credit position. On the other hand, it may encourage foreign
ownership of capital in the host country. Empirical evidence should tell us which effect
dominates. 
4 The statutory tax rate is more important for profit shifting by multinational corporations.
7
2.3 Which tax matters?
Some studies use the statutory corporate income tax to measure the tax effects on FDI.
However, the tax treatment of FDI is generally a complex issue, as we saw in the previous
subsection. Using the statutory tax rate can therefore be misleading.
4 It is impossible, however,
to capture all the complex details of the tax system that potentially affect foreign investment in
an empirical analysis. Most studies therefore rely on some type of effective tax rate. An effective
tax rate is a rough proxy variable that summarises the interaction of various tax rules on an
investment. The effective tax rate can be computed in several ways. Most of the empirical studies
use either of the following three tax rates. 
(i) First, there are average tax rates (ATRs) computed from data. They measure the taxes paid by
firms divided by a measure for operating surplus. The data refer either to micro or macro data.
The ATRs have the advantage that they take account of tax planning activities, complex tax
provisions and discretionary administrative practices of tax authorities. 
(ii) A second measure for the effective tax rate is the marginal effective tax rate (METR)
computed from tax codes. It measures the wedge between the pre- and post tax return on a
marginal investment project that does not yield an economic rent. Hence, it refers to the
incentive effects of taxes on marginal investment decisions.
(ii) Finally, some studies use the average effective tax rate (AETR). This measure is also based on
tax codes, but it concerns the wedge between the pre- and post tax return on a typical investment
project on which firms may earn an economic rent. This is important for decisions regarding
lumpy investment, investment in the presence of imperfect competition, or for locational
decisions of firms. Devereux and Griffith (1998a) argue that investment decisions are often
inframarginal.
3 A review of empirical studies
This section starts with a review of empirical studies on taxation and foreign direct investment.
In particular, all studies that include foreign capital on the left hand side and a measure for the
tax rate on the right hand side have been considered, including working papers and unpublished
articles. Only if we were unable to derive the appropriate elasticity values, we removed a study
from our sample. In subsection 3.2, we make the outcomes of the studies comparable by
deriving uniformly defined elasticities. These form the basis for our meta analysis of the next
section. 
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3.1 A review of the literature
The literature on taxation and FDI starts with Hartman (1984). He explains the aggregate inflow
of direct investment in the United States as a ratio of GNP (K/Y) between 1965 - 1979 by the
following three terms:
(1)  ln(K/Y)  =  a1 ln[r(1-t)] + a2 ln[r(1-t)] + a3 ln[(1-t)/(1-t)]
The first term on the right hand side of (1), ln[r(1-t)], measures the after-tax rate of return on US
investment for foreign investors. According to Hartman, this reflects the impact on new investment.
The second term, ln[r(1-t)], is the gross rate of return on investment in the US, reduced by the US tax
on FDI. This variable is said to reflect the effect of acquiring existing capital on which no
extraordinary return is earned. The third term on the right hand side of (1) is a relative tax term,
capturing a valuation effect. In particular, if a tax change makes it more attractive for domestic firms
to invest, it becomes more expensive for foreign investors to acquire a US firm. The focus of
Hartmans paper is on the distinction between FDI financed out of retained earnings and transfer of
funds. Hartman claims that retained earnings should be more sensitive to US taxes because mature
firms will use retained earnings as the marginal source of finance (which is cheaper than transfer of
new funds). Hartmans results imply that, indeed, the tax rate elasticity for retained earnings is
significant while for transfers the results are insignificant.
A number of subsequent papers have extended, modified or criticized Hartmans paper. Boskin
and Gale (1987) extend the Hartman analysis by using a longer time series from 1956 - 1984 and
alternative data for the rate of return. They also experiment with a linear instead of a log specification.
The results of Boskin and Gale more or less confirm the main findings of Hartman, i.e. the impact of
US taxes on retained earnings is more robust than the impact on transfer of funds. Young (1988) also
extends the Hartman analysis by means of a somewhat longer sample period from 1953 - 1984, a
slightly different specification with a lagged investment term, and revised investment data. He
confirms Hartmans original conclusions and even reports positive rather than negative semi-
elasticities for transfer of funds. Murthy (1989) re-estimates Youngs result by maximum likelihood
estimation, rather than OLS, in order to adjust for the presence of autocorrelation. His elasticities are
somewhat larger than those in Young (1988) while the significance of the parameters improves. The
qualitative conclusions, however, remain the same. 
Newlon (1987) casts doubts on the studies in the realm of Hartman. First, Newlon shows that
these studies have not used the appropriate data for the rate of return on FDI for 1965-1973. Second,
he notes that there is a problem of spurious correlation. In particular, the after-tax rate of return on
FDI is constructed as the total earnings by foreign controlled companies, divided by invested capital.
Since total earnings comprise reinvested earnings and repatriations, the rate of return variable
contains the same component (and is almost equivalent if repatriations are low) as the dependent 
5 We rely on the paper by Slemrod (1990) to include Newlons (1987) elasticities since we were unable to get the
original PhD thesis of Newlon.
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variable. To deal with these problems, Newlon (1987) uses alternative data. His conclusions are
nevertheless in line with the previous findings of Hartman and others.
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Slemrod (1990) also criticizes the earlier studies. First, he argues that the focus of the
literature on the Hartman specification is unjustified since it lacks a perfectly specified model.
In such a situation, one should investigate different specifications. Second, Slemrod raises
doubts on the FDI data which are constructed from periodic benchmark surveys. This
construction implies that mismeasurement becomes larger, the further a year is away from the
benchmark year. To correct for this, Slemrod includes dummies for the gap between a year and
the benchmark year. Moreover, he includes also a dummy for post 1974 observations since the
BEA changed the definition of FDI in that year. Third, Slemrod controls for other variables that
affect FDI (and which are potentially correlated with the tax term). Finally, Slemrod uses an
alternative measure for the tax rate, namely the marginal effective tax rate derived by Auerbach
and Hines (1988). With these four modifications, Slemrod re-estimates the tax rate elasticities in
several ways. He finds that retained earnings are not responsive to US taxes, while for transfers
a significant elasticity is found. This result is opposite to that of Hartman and others. Slemrod
also explores the response of aggregate FDI, which is equal to the sum of retained earnings and
transfers. The results suggest that taxes exert a significant negative effect on this aggregate FDI
variable.
Another contribution of Slemrod (1990) is that he controls for the tax system in the home
country of the parent. In particular, Slemrod argues that the tax response by investors from
credit countries (Japan, UK and Italy) should be different from those of exemption countries
(Germany, Netherlands, Canada and France). To explore this claim, he considers the bilateral
investments flows from seven industrialized countries in the US and then looks whether there is
a systematic difference between the two types of investors. The picture that emerges from this
exercise is not clear, though. In fact, the country-specific evidence yields mixed results on the tax
effect on FDI, including many insignificant coefficients. Moreover, Slemrod finds that the level of the
home country tax rate and the difference in statutory tax rates between the investing country and the
US do not change the results much.
Slemrods qualifications to the earlier literature have made researchers reluctant to continue
using aggregate time series data along the lines of Hartman. Indeed, aggregate time series have been
rarely used in subsequent contributions. Only recently, Billington (1999) and Broekman and van
Vliet (2000) have used aggregate FDI flows to estimate the tax elasticity. Billington uses a panel of 7
OECD countries between 1986 - 1993 with aggregate FDI inflows. He regresses the log FDI to the
square of the statutory tax rates and reports significant but small elasticities. Broekman and van Vliet
focus on aggregate FDI inflows in 15 EU countries using data from 1989 - 1998. Using a simple 
6 Swenson (1994) refers to Auerbach and Hasset (1993) to motivate her choice of data. Auerbach and Hasset
(1993) distinguish three alternative data, namely affiliate data on new plant and equipment, acquisitions of existing
US companies, and the establishment of new companies by foreign investors.  It is not clear which series is used
by Swenson (1994). She might also have used  the sum of the three series as was done by Auerbach and Hassett.
In our analysis, we have assumed that her capital data are similar to data on PPE.
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linear specification, they report elasticities in the order of -2. Neither Billington nor Broekman and
van Vliet distinguish between retained earnings and transfer of funds. 
Swenson (1994) uses aggregate FDI inflows into the US between 1979-1991, but distinguishes 18
different industries. She regresses the log of FDI in the entire panel to the average tax rates,
distinguished for the respective industries. For FDI, she uses different data than previous studies. In
particular, instead of financial flows, she uses data that better correspond to foreign investment.
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Swenson reports a positive elasticity for alternative specifications and alternative tax measures.
She thus confirms the Scholes and Wolfson (1990) hypothesis, suggesting that higher effective
tax rates in the US will raise FDI from investors in tax credit countries.
Some studies during the 1990s have taken up Slemrods idea to exploit bilateral FDI flows. 
Cassou (1997) repeats Slemrods analysis for individual countries investing in the US, thereby
using data between 1970 - 1989 and replacing the Netherlands by Sweden. He reports primarily
insignificant results, especially for retained earnings. Cassou is the last study in our sample that
makes a distinction between FDI financed by retained earnings and transfer of funds.
Other studies have pooled bilateral FDI flows in order to construct a panel. First of all, Jun
(1994) constructs a panel of FDI flows from 10 OECD countries into the US. Using a linear
specification and alternative tax measures, he reports mainly insignificant results.  Devereux and
Freeman (1995) use a panel of bilateral FDI flows between 7 OECD countries during 1985 -
1989. Using a linear specification, they regress FDI flows to the user cost of capital, derived
from Devereux and Pearsson (1995). Devereux and Freeman find small negative elasticity values,
but most coefficients are not significant. Pain and Young (1996) focus on FDI from Germany
and the UK into 11 locations during 1977 - 1992. They use a log specification and include lagged
FDI in their estimation. Moreover, they stress the importance of the home country tax for the
responsiveness of FDI to host country tax rates. The long-run elasticity in Pain and Youngs
study is significantly negative and large for the UK, but insignificant and small for Germany.
Using a similar specification and bilateral FDI from 11 investing countries into 46 locations in
1991, Shang-Jin Wei (1997) finds significant negative elasticities.
Studies using data on financial FDI flows or stocks have some serious limitations. As
illustrated by Auerbach and Hasset (1993), FDI comprises a number of different components
that can respond very differently to tax rates. Therefore, studies using aggregate FDI flows are
difficult to interpret and strongly influenced by the composition of the FDI aggregate. A number
of cross section studies in the US have therefore used data on property, plant and equipment
(PPE) which is believed to be more closely related to real investment. Grubert and Mutti (1991) 
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explore the sensitivity of US investors in 33 countries with respect to foreign effective tax rates.
They find a significant semi-elasticity of investment of around 0.7. Using the same method,
Hines and Rice (1994) find a higher semi-elasticity between 3.3 and 6.6. The difference in
magnitudes of the Grubert-Mutti and Hines-Rice elasticities is explained by the use of different data.
First, Hines and Rice use data for more countries, including a number of tax havens. Second, Hines
and Rice use data on all nonbank companies while Grubert and Mutti concentrate on manufacturing
firms alone. The higher elasticity reported by Hines and Rice suggests that capital flows to tax havens
and by non-manufacturing firms (which may contain much more financial capital) are probably more
responsive to taxes than is real capital. 
Grubert and Mutti (2000) exploit micro data of more than 500 US tax returns to construct an
aggregated data set on average effective tax rates and investment in plant and equipment by US
multinationals in 60 locations. Using different specifications and different concepts of the average
tax rate, Grubert and Mutti report significantly negative elasticities. Altshuler et al. (2001) have
exploited similar data as Grubert and Mutti and use a similar specification. They focus on the
distinction in elasticities between 1984 and 1992. For 1984, they find an elasticity that is smaller than
for 1992. This suggests that capital has become more responsive to taxes during the 1980s.
Hines (1996) builds on Slemrods idea to use information on individual countries direct
investment into the US. He uses data on PPE from seven investing countries into 50 different US
states and explores the impact of state corporate income taxes on the allocation of FDI. Hines uses a
different specification than Slemrod: he explains the share of FDI by an investing country in each of
the 50 US states in terms of total investment in the US. Hines assumes that countries using the tax
credit system will not respond to US tax rates since investors in these countries will be compensated
by means for foreign tax credits. Hence, the elasticity for territorial countries is derived conditional on
a zero elasticity for worldwide investors. Hines reports significantly negative elasticities that are larger
than found in most previous studies. The approach of Hines was later used by Gorter and Parikh
(2000) and Benassy-Quere et al. (2001), who both use a panel of bilateral FDI flows between OECD
countries. Both studies report significant tax effects on FDI by exemption countries. 
Swenson (2001) takes up the qualifications by Auerbach and Hasset (1993) and distinguishes
between 6 different components of FDI: new plants, plant expansions, mergers and acquisitions,
joint ventures, equity increases, and other FDI. The data refer to the number of investment projects,
rather than the total amount of investment and comprise 46 countries investing in 50 US states.
The tax elasticity of new plants and plant expansions appears to be significantly negative for
most investing countries. Hence, real investments decline in response to higher US state
corporate tax rates. However, the effect of mergers and acquisitions is significantly positive in all
cases. This suggests that, if mergers and acquisitions take up a larger share of aggregate FDI, it
becomes less likely that the tax effect on aggregate FDI will be significantly negative. 
A different strand of literature on taxation and foreign investment analyses the impact of
host country taxes on the probability that a multinational chooses a location for an investment. 
7 The procedure to derive semi-elasticities from each of the original studies is described in more detail in an
appendix that can be downloaded from http://www.cpb.nl/eng/general/org/afdelingen/eca/taxcomp.html. Also the
meta sample can be found on that page.
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In particular, Bartik (1985) explains the probability of location for new plants into each of the 50
US states by, among others, the state statutory corporate income tax. He reports a significantly
negative elasticity. In the same spirit, Papke (1991) explains the location of plant births in 50 US
states by the effective tax rates on specific industries. He reports very different elasticity values
for the various industries. Devereux and Griffith (1998b) also find a significant adverse impact
of the average effective tax rate on the probability of US firms locating in either France,
Germany or the UK.
3.2 Constructing a database
The studies discussed above use different specifications, thus producing coefficients with
different interpretations. Moreover, authors either do not report the corresponding elasticity
values or adopt different definitions of elasticities. To make the outcomes of various studies
comparable, we transformed the coefficients of each of the studies into a uniformly defined
elasticity, namely the semi-elasticity (or tax rate elasticity).
The interpretation of the semi-elasticity is easy: it measures the percentage change in FDI in
response to a 1%-point change in the tax rate, e.g. a decline from 35% to 34%. Hence, the level of





Table 3.1 lists the 25 studies that we reported above and shows some characteristics of the semi-
elasticities we obtained from them. Overall, we have derived 371 semi-elasticities that, together,
form our meta sample. Table 3.1 reveals a great variation among the 25 studies. First of all, the
number of semi-elasticities derived from each study differs: it ranges from 2 semi-elasticities
(Newlon, Papke and Billington) to 95 (Swenson, 2001). Secondly, there is great variation in the
mean value of the semi-elasticity, ranging from 10.9 (Hines) to +1.3 (Swenson, 1994). As
shown by the maxima in table 3.1, ten of the 25 studies report at least one positive semi-
elasticity. The majority of semi-elasticities, however, is negative. A third observation from table
3.1 involves the standard deviation of the reported semi-elasticities. In some studies, the
elasticities feature a large dispersion with standard deviations exceeding 10 (Slemrod,
Hines&Rice and Cassou), while others show more moderate dispersions. A final source of
heterogeneity among the studies concerns the number of significant semi-elasticities. Overall,
less than half of the semi-elasticities is significantly different from zero. However, whereas some 
13
studies report only significant parameters, others include a large number of insignificant ones.
The mean value of the significant semi-elasticities is somewhat larger (in absolute terms) than of
the entire sample. 
The distribution of the entire meta sample of 371 semi-elasticities is depicted in figure 3.1. The
mean value in the meta sample is 4.7 and the standard deviation is equal to 9. More than 80%
of all observations (300 out of 371) has a negative sign. The most extreme observations have
values of 84.5 and +17.8, both obtained from Slemrods study. Because of some extreme values
left from the mean, the median semi-elasticity in the sample is smaller than the mean, namely
3.2. The extreme values thus seem to have an important impact on the characteristics of the
distribution of semi-elasticities.











1 Hartman, 1984 6 -2.6 -3.5 2.0 -4.0 2.3 3 -3.5
2 Bartik, 1985 3 -6.9 -6.6 -5.7 -8.5 1.4 3 -6.9
3 Boskin&Gale, 1987 12 -5.8 -2.7 0.3 -21.2 7.6 4 -9.5
4 Newlon, 1987 2 -0.4 -0.4 3.5 -4.3 5.5 1 -4.3
5 Young, 1988 12 -1.1 -2.1 5.3 -9.2 4.2 8 -1.0
6 Murthy, 1989 4 -0.6 -0.7 0.5 -1.6 1.0 2 -1.4
7 Slemrod, 1990 58 -5.5 -3.5 17.8 -84.5 14.4 24 -9.5
8 Grubert&Mutti, 1991 6 -1.7 -1.6 -0.6 -3.3 1.2 3 -0.7
9 Papke, 1991 2 -4.9 -4.9 -0.9 -8.8 5.6 1 -8.8
10 Hines&Rice, 1994 4 -10.7 -5.0 -1.2 -31.7 14.1 2 -5.0
11 Jun, 1994 10 -0.5 -1.3 5.9 -5.4 3.2 1 5.9
12 Swenson, 1994 10 1.3 2.7 5.1 -8.1 4.3 6 1.6
13 Devereux&Freeman, 1995 4 -1.6 -1.6 -1.4 -1.7 0.1 1 -1.7
14 Hines, 1996 46 -10.9 -10.2 -1.1 -36.7 8.2 21 -15.0
15 Pain&Young, 1996 6 -1.5 -1.4 -0.4 -2.8 1.2 3 -2.6
16 Cassou, 1997 17 -7.5 -2.8 3.1 -44.7 13.5 4 -4.3
17 Shang-Jin Wei, 1997 5 -5.2 -5.0 -4.7 -6.2 0.6 5 -5.2
18 Devereux&Griffith, 1998 10 -0.8 -0.9 0.0 -1.2 0.4 8 -0.9
19 Billington, 1999 2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 2 -0.1
20 Broekman&Vliet, 2000 3 -3.3 -3.5 -2.5 -4.0 0.8 3 -3.3
21 Gorter&Parikh, 2000 15 -4.5 -4.3 4.2 -14.3 4.2 10 -5.7
22 Grubert&Mutti, 2000 15 -4.0 -4.2 -1.7 -5.8 1.2 14 -4.1
23 Altshuler et al., 2001 20 -2.7 -2.6 -1.4 -4.0 0.8 13 -3.0
24 Benassy et al., 2001 4 -5.0 -5.0 -2.2 -7.9 3.0 3 -5.8
25 Swenson, 2001 95 -4.0 -3.2 8.0 -29.9 8.4 33 -9.3











































Figure 3.1   Distribution of semi-elasticities
In figure 3.2, we have eliminated some extreme values from the sample. In particular, the figure
excludes semi-elasticities that are two standard deviations larger or smaller than the mean. Thus,
it includes only semi-elasticities between 22.7 and +13.2. This comprises 95% of the
observations, i.e. the sample size drops from 371 to 351. The mean value of the semi-elasticity in
figure 3.2 is 3.3, i.e. more than 1.4 smaller in absolute terms than the mean value in figure 3.1.
Also the median drops slightly. Apparently, the number of extreme negative semi-elasticities is
larger than the number of extreme positive semi-elasticities. As we can see from figure 3.2, the
majority of observations lies between 5 and 0. 
As observed from table 3.1, more than half of all semi-elasticities is not significantly different
from zero at the 95% confidence level. Figure 3.3 shows the distribution if only the significant
elasticities are considered. Here, we have also eliminated the extreme values, so that 165
observations remain. In figure 3.3, the mean value of the semi-elasticities is 4.7, which is more
than 1.4 higher than the corresponding value in figure 3.2. Hence, the significant semi-
elasticities tend to be larger in absolute magnitude than the insignificant ones. Moreover, by
comparing figures 3.2 and 3.3, we see that it is primarily the positive semi-elasticities that are
insignificant. Indeed, the median of the significant semi-elasticities is 4 which is almost 1








































































Figure 3.2   Distribution of semi-elasticities, excluding extreme values
Figure 3.3   Distribution of significant sem-elasticities, excluding extreme values 
8 If also the extreme elasticities are included in the computation, we arrive at a mean elasticity of 1.1.
9 We choose for the semi-elasticities because their interpretation is most straightforward and independent of the
tax rate. We have also run regressions with the ordinary elasticities. This gives us the same qualitative conclusions
as the analysis of semi-elasticities.
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The semi-elasticities can be transformed into an ordinary elasticity by multiplying with the tax,
i.e.
 =     0
0
	
The ordinary elasticity measures the FDI impact of a 1% change in the tax rate, rather than a 1%-
point change (as the semi-elasticity does). For instance, it measures a reduction in the tax rate
from 35% to 34.65%. Hence, the elasticity depends on the magnitude of the tax at which the
marginal FDI impact is evaluated. We have used the tax rates adopted in each of the underlying
studies to compute these elasticities. The tax rates differ substantially across studies. This is
because of different types of tax rates, different countries, and different time periods. In
particular, some studies use statutory tax rates in US states with a mean value of 0.06. Many
others adopt country tax rates, usually some form of effective tax or average tax, with values
between 0.2 and 0.5. The mean value of the tax rates in our sample is 0.268%. 
The mean of the tax elasticity of FDI in our meta sample is 0.7 while the median is 0.5.
8
This is close the consensus estimate of 0.5 to 0.6, suggested by Hines (1997; 1999), which
is based on casual observation. On average, the mean elasticity value of 0.7 corresponds to a
mean value of the semi-elasticity of 3.3.
4 Meta analysis of the tax-rate elasticities
This section presents a meta analysis of the semi-elasticities.
9 Meta analysis refers to the
statistical analysis of results from individual studies. Next to summarizing results found by
previous studies, it aims to add knowledge by relating the variation in estimates of elasticities to
the underlying differences in study characteristics. In doing so, meta analysis goes beyond an
ordinary survey of the literature. Moreover, the statistical analysis forces one to be explicit in the
selection process of the original studies. This is not to say that meta analysis is without
problems. Especially, sample selection and publication bias, heterogeneity, and dependence of
observations may cause problems.
First of all, an important methodological problem of meta analysis is the possibility of
publication bias. This occurs if only statistically significant results with the correct size are
being published. One reason might be that editors of journals prefer to publish these correct
results. In our sample, we included several unpublished studies. In this way, we gain some
insight in the importance of this aspect of publication bias. It should be noted, however, that 
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some of these papers may be published in a journal in the future. Another aspect of publication
bias is that researchers do not write up their unsatisfactory results. It is therefore impossible to
include these results in the meta-analysis. Incidentally, about half of the semi-elasticities in our
sample are statistically insignificant at the five percent level.
A closely related concept is sample selection bias (or retrieval bias). This occurs when only
studies are collected that use the same theoretical perspective, or studies that are published in
the same journal. This can be harmful when there is a systematic relationship between the
characteristics of the sampling process and the significance of the effect size.
Heterogeneity is almost inherent to meta-analysis as studies differ in numerous dimensions.
In particular, different studies use different variables, different samples, and different
estimation techniques. In our meta sample, the estimated elasticities are obtained from 25
different studies, each with their own characteristics. Indeed, the studies show considerable
heterogeneity in terms of the type of tax rate used, the kind of foreign capital data that is
explored, and the countries that are considered. This heterogeneity renders a direct comparison
of studies difficult. At the same time, however, the diversity in study characteristics makes it
possible to examine their effect on the magnitude and significance of the elasticity.
Related to heterogeneity is the problem of dependence. Because multiple elasticities are used
from each study, the observations in our meta sample are mutually dependent. For instance, we
draw no less than 95 elasticities from the Swenson (2001) study. Bijmolt and Pieters (2001)
show, however, that taking all elasticities from the underlying studies in a meta analysis is
preferable to taking only one observation per study.
These problems of meta analysis imply that the results should be interpreted with caution.
However, the same problems apply to ordinary literature surveys. As illustrated before, meta
analysis may still yield additional insights as compared to surveys. Below, subsection 4.1 starts
with a simple analysis of variation. Subsection 4.2 presents the meta regressions.
4.1 ANOVA type of study
This section performs an ANalysis Of VAariation (ANOVA) which refers to the pairwise
correlations between the elasticities and their underlying study characteristics. This gives a first
indication of how the variation in elasticities is correlated with the variation in, for instance, the
specification in the original study, the data that are used, the estimation procedure, etc. The
ANOVA does not yet justify firm conclusions on the systematic impact of these study
characteristics on the elasticities, however. Indeed, this would require a multivariate analysis 
10 In a sense, the ANOVA reflects what might be implicitly done in ordinary literature surveys. The advantage of the
ANOVA is that it is probably more systematic.
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which is presented in section 4.2. The ANOVA is only a first step in analysing the variation in
elasticities.
10
Table 4.1 Study characteristics and the sign of semi-elasticities
Number of observations Sign of the semi-elasticities
significantly positive insignificant significantly negative
Source of finance
Retained Earnings 40 3 55 43
Transfers 42 5 62 33
Finance unspecified 269 4 51 45
Taxation of foreign source income
Exempt 137 2 68 30
Credit 116 2 44 54
System unspecified 98 10 42 48
Type of foreign capital data
Number of Locations 116 5 62 33
Capital 235 4 48 48
PPE 84 6 39 55
Plants 43 0 65 35
M&A 24 21 71 8
FDI 151 3 53 44
Manufacturing 182 4 56 40
No specific industry 165 5 49 46
Type of tax data
Country statutory rate 12 0 50 50
State statutory rate 134 4 64 31
Marginal effective tax rate 57 2 58 40
Average effective tax rate 9 0 11 89
Micro tax rate 80 8 31 61
Macro average tax rate 58 3 59 38
Home tax 34 3 62 35
Else 317 4 52 44
Other characteristics
Unpublished 43 2 42 56
Published 308 5 54 41
Logarithmic 193 7 55 38
Linear 158 1 49 49
OLS 183 3 49 49
Cross section 96 0 41 59
Time series 102 3 58 39
Panel 153 8 57 35
All 351 4 53 43 
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We present the ANOVA results for a selection of study characteristics. These are presented in
table 4.1. The second column of this table shows how many observations in our meta sample
feature each of the study characteristics. For instance, the first three rows reveal that 40
observations in our meta sample relate to semi-elasticities for retained earnings, 42 refer to
transfer of funds, and 269 refer to investments where the source of finance is not specified.
Among the other study characteristics that are of interest in table 4.1, we see the distinction
between tax credit and tax exemption countries, the type of foreign capital data used, and the
type of tax rate used. 
Table 4.1 reveals also the percentage of semi-elasticities per study characteristic that is positive
and significant, insignificant, or negative and significant. The last row of table 4.1 shows that 4%
of all semi-elasticities has the unexpected positive sign, 53% is insignificant, and 43% has a
Table 4.2 ANalysis Of VAriation
Semi-elasticity
a benchmark sample Including extremes Significant
Number of observations 351 371 166
Source of finance
Retained Earnings (unspecified) 0.14 3.15 ** 0.08
Transfers (unspecified) -1.40 -2.54 * -0.52
Taxation of foreign source income
Exempt (unspecified) 2.16 ** 5.21 ** 4.96 **
Credit (unspecified) 0.56 0.81 0.92
Type of foreign capital data
Number of Locations (Capital) -1.08 * -1.00 -0.01
PPE (FDI) 2.65 ** 2.41 ** 0.80
Plants (FDI) 3.67 ** 4.20 ** 3.83 **
M&A (FDI) -5.17 ** -6.64 ** -2.95
Manufacturing (all) 1.56 ** 1.35 1.86 **
Type of tax data
State statutory rate (CSTR
b) 2.81 * 4.56 * 5.48 **
Marginal effective tax rate (CSTR 
b) 1.08 3.60 4.14 **
Average effective tax rate (CSTR
b) -0.76 -0.76 -0.99
Micro average tax rate (CSTR
b) 0.92 1.28 1.32
Macro average tax rate (CSTR
b) 1.25 2.54 2.09
Control for home tax (not controled) -2.70 ** -0.64 -2.46 *
Other characteristics
Unpublished (published) -0.13 -1.73 -0.26
Logarithmic (linear) -1.88 ** -2.43 ** -2.02 **
OLS (other) -1.32 ** -1.66 * -1.93 **
Cross section (panel) 2.92 ** 3.30 ** 0.98
Time series (panel) 0.31 1.51 0.50
Average sample year 0.05 0.02 0.02
A * means that a variable is significant at the 10% confidence level; ** at the 5% level.
a All semi-elasticities are pre-multiplied by a minus sign
b CSTR = Country Statutory Tax Rate 
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significant and expected negative sign. We observe from table 4.1 that semi-elasticities for
transfer of funds are typically less significant as compared to other sources of finance. Likewise,
the semi-elasticities for tax exemption countries are less often significantly negative (in 30% of
the cases) than are the semi-elasticities for tax credit countries (54% of the cases) or unspecified
semi-elasticities (48% of the cases). The 24 semi-elasticities for mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
are typically positive or insignificant. The opposite holds true for the semi-elasticities for plants
(comprising new plants and plant expansions). Compared to studies using FDI data, we observe
from table 4.1 that studies using PPE data yield a higher percentage significant elasticities.
Similarly, studies using micro ATRs, AETRs or country statutory tax rates yield relatively often
a significant elasticity. The opposite holds true for studies using state statutory tax rates or
macro ATRs. Somewhat surprisingly, published studies yield a smaller share of significant
semi-elasticities than unpublished studies. Studies with a linear specification (as compared to a
log specification) and those using cross-section data (as opposed to time series or panel data)
also feature a higher percentage significant semi-elasticities. 
For the various study characteristics introduced in table 4.1, table 4.2 reveals the ANOVA
results. The correlations are presented relative to some benchmark set of study characteristics.
These benchmark choices are given between brackets in each of the rows of table 4.2. We
perform the ANOVA for three different samples. First, we look at the meta sample that excludes
extreme values, i.e. semi-elasticities that lie outside the range of plus and minus two times the
standard deviation from the mean. This so-called base sample contains 351 observations (first
column of table 4.2). Second, we analyse the meta sample when these extreme observations are
also included. This sample contains 371 observations (second column of table 4.2). Finally, we
restrict the meta sample to the 165 semi-elasticities that are significantly different from zero
(third column of table 4.2).
For presentational convenience, we have put a minus sign for all semi-elasticities before
doing the ANOVA analysis and the regression analysis. Thus, we transformed the majority of
semi-elasticities into positive figures. In table 4.2, we indicate cross correlations that are









































As discussed in section 2.1, statistical information on FDI comprises investments that are
financed by retained earnings and transfer of funds. The majority of studies does not
distinguish with respect to the source of finance (see table 4.1). However, the early literature
pays due attention to the distinction between retained earnings and transfers. In particular,
Hartman, Boskin&Gale, Young, Murthy and Newlon all suggest that retained earnings are more
responsive to taxes than are transfers. The first two rows of table 4.2 reflects these findings in
our ANOVA: it reveals that the semi-elasticity of retained earnings is 0.14 larger than that of 
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unspecified semi-elasticities, while the semi-elasticity of transfers is 1.4 smaller. Both
coefficients of the ANOVA are not statistically significant, however.
If we include the 20 extreme observations (second column of table 4.2), the differences
become more pronounced and statistically significant: the semi-elasticity for retained earnings is
3.15 larger than that of unspecified semi-elasticities, while that of transfers is 2.54 smaller.
Hence, the extreme observations tend to have a disproportionate impact on the correlation of
semi-elasticities with the source of finance. If we restrict the sample to significant semi-
elasticities alone (third column of table 4.2), the difference between retained earnings, transfers































The next observation from table 4.2 refers to the distinction between tax credit systems and tax
exemption systems. As argued in section 2.2, investors from tax exemption countries are more
likely to respond to changes in host country taxes than investors from tax credit countries. Table
4.2 confirms this observation. The first column suggests that, compared to studies that do not
specify the home country of the investor, semi-elasticities that refer to investors from tax
exemption countries are 2.16 larger. This effect is statistically significant. For investors from tax
credit countries, the semi-elasticity is 0.56 larger but not significant. If we include extreme
observations in the sample (second column), or if we restrict the sample to significant
parameters (third column), the difference in elasticities between exemption and credit countries
becomes more pronounced. Hence, the ANOVA tends to support the hypothesis that investors
from tax exemption countries are more responsive to taxes than are investors from tax credit
countries. However, the higher responsiveness of investors from tax credit countries as
compared to unspecified investors (which comprises a mixture of credit and exempt investors) is











































The total amount of foreign capital is equal to the number of foreign locations, multiplied by the
average amount of capital invested in each of these locations. Table 4.2 shows that, compared to
foreign capital data, data on the number of locations yield a semi-elasticity that is 1.08 smaller.
This effect is significant at the 10% confidence level. This suggests that not only the number of
foreign locations responds negatively to tax rates, but also the average amount of capital that is
invested in each of these locations. If we restrict the sample to significant elasticities alone,
however, the difference between foreign capital and the number of foreign locations disappears.
Compared to financial flow data for FDI, more narrow measures for foreign capital yield
substantially different semi-elasticities. To illustrate, data on PPE yield a 2.65 higher elasticity,
while plants feature a 3.67 higher semi-elasticity than FDI. Mergers and acquisitions, in
contrast, features a 5.17 smaller semi-elasticity and thus gets a different sign. These results are 
11 Only the study by Swenson (2001) makes an explicit distinction between plants and mergers and acquisitions.
The outcomes of our ANOVA thus reflect her findings.
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robust with respect to the sample used.
11 They are also consistent with the theory. Indeed,
section 2.2 concludes that mergers and acquisitions are unlikely to expand in response to lower
host-country tax rates, while investment in plants and equipment is more likely to increase.
As was apparent from the discussion about the differences between Grubert&Mutti and
Hines&Rice, restricting the sample to manufacturing firms is likely to yield smaller semi-
elasticities. Table 4.2, however, suggests the opposite. Indeed, we find that data for
manufacturing firms tend to yield larger instead of smaller semi-elasticities. Section 4.2 will


























Studies use different types of tax rates to measure the tax effect on FDI. In particular, most
economists argue that country statutory tax rates are imperfect measures to determine the
impact on investment behaviour by multinational firms. Indeed, effective or average tax rates are
thought to be a better approximation of the tax burden on foreign investment. Table 4.2 reveals
that the type of tax indeed matters for the semi-elasticities. In particular, studies using METRs
or ATRs based on either micro or macro data, yield higher semi-elasticities than studies
adopting the country statutory rates. The AETRs exert an opposite effect, however.
We observe from table 4.2 that studies using state statutory tax rates in the US (Hines;
Swenson, 2001) also yield larger elasticities. This may be because these rates are proportional to
the METR as the tax base of US states is, to a large extent, uniformly determined at the federal
level.
Hartman (1985) claims that home-country taxes have no impact on FDI, at least not for FDI
financed by retained earnings. In contrast, Slemrod and Pain&Young, among others, have
suggested that it could matter if a study includes the magnitude of the home-country tax rate in
the analysis as a control variable. This is confirmed by table 4.2. Indeed, studies that include this
































The lower part of table 4.2 reveals the cross correlation between some other study characteristics
and the semi-elasticities. We see that unpublished studies yield smaller semi-elasticities than
published ones. Also logarithmic specifications and estimations via OLS tend to yield relatively
small semi-elasticities. Compared to studies using panel data, cross sections tend to yield an, on
average, 2.92 higher semi-elasticity.
Has capital become more mobile during the 1980's, as has been suggested by Altshuler et
al? We test this hypothesis by exploring the correlation of the median sample year in the 
12 The ANOVA can be found on our website, http://www.cpb.nl/eng/general/org/afdelingen/eca/taxcomp.html, for
a broader set of study characteristics.
13 We control for Belgium as an investing country in all regressions. The reason is that Belgium is only
distinguished separately in the Swenson (2001) study in which it yields a very high semi-elasticity.
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underlying studies with the semi-elasticity. Table 4.2 suggests that studies using more recent
data indeed yield higher elasticities (see the last row). The effect is not statistically significant,
however.
A number of other study characteristics have been explored but not reported here.
12 Some of
these results were difficult to interpret, possibly because they are correlated with other
characteristics that are responsible for the different magnitude of the elasticities. This is a more
general problem of the pairwise comparisons in the ANOVA. The multivariate analysis in the
next section should take up these cross correlations and, therefore, provide a more rigorous
insight into the causes of structural differences in the estimated semi-elasticities.
4.2 Meta regressions
This section presents the meta regressions. We have experimented with different combinations
of study characteristics. In particular, table 4.3 shows the regression results for five different
combinations of explanatory variables. The first column contains only the main variables of
interest, i.e. those that have been discussed in the previous section. In the second column of
table 4.3, we control for some additional study characteristics such as published/unpublished,
log/linear specification, ols/other estimator, cross section/time series/panel data, stock/flow of
FDI, and inward/outward FDI. In the third column, we include study-fixed effects, i.e. a dummy
variable for each study from which we obtained more than 10 semi-elasticities. This may be seen
as a modest attempt to deal with the dependency problem discussed above. The fourth column
of table 4.3 includes dummy variables that reflect whether the underlying studies themselves
control for variables like GDP, population size, agglomeration effects, exchange rates,
unemployment and openness. The final column of table 4.3 shows the regression results if we
include country-fixed effects, i.e. a dummy variable for each investing country if it could be
identified from the underlying study. This controls for unobserved heterogeneity of investing
countries, such as special features of their tax systems.
13
Apart from different control variables, we have also varied with the sample in our
regressions. In particular, table 4.4 shows the regressions with the main variables of interest in
case of three samples. The first column of table 4.4 uses the sample of 351 observations, i.e. the
sample that excludes the extreme values (this sample is also used in table 4.3). The second
column includes the 20 extreme observations. The third column of table 4.4 is restricted to the
165 significant semi-elasticities. 
14 We have also run a regression with a sample that excludes these studies. In that case, we find results opposite
from those reported in tables 4.3 and 4.4. In particular, retained earnings then yields a smaller semi-elasticity than
transfers. 
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Below, we discuss the regression results for each of the main variables of interest. By discussing
the results for the different specifications and different samples, we immediately elaborate on



































Regarding the source of finance of FDI, all regressions reveal that the semi-elasticity for retained
earnings is larger than semi-elasticities for unspecified data. For transfers, we usually report a
negative coefficient. This reflects the findings by Hartman, Boskin&Gale, Newlon, Young and
Murthy that retained earnings are more responsive to taxes than are transfer of funds.
14
However, the coefficients are never significant in our meta regressions. 
Given the qualifications by Newlon (1987) and Slemrod (1990), we should be careful to
conclude that retained earnings are indeed more sensitive to taxes than are transfers (see section
Table 4.3 Meta regressions for different combinations of study characteristics
base regression
a more characteristics




Retained Earnings 0.83 1.55 0.40 1.68 0.53
Transfers -0.95 0.00 -0.84 0.30 -1.26
Exempt 0.76 -0.33 1.13 -0.76 1.65 *
Credit 0.87 -0.32 1.26 * -0.37 1.46
Number of Locations -6.97 ** -2.30 -4.79 ** -1.65 -8.21 **
PPE -0.43 1.06 -1.12 3.33 * -2.19
Plants 3.25 ** 5.54 ** 6.14 ** 5.09 ** 3.54 **
M&A -7.55 ** -5.26 ** -4.66 ** -5.70 ** -7.29 **
Manufacturing 0.06 0.04 -0.54 1.23 -1.54
State statutory rate 7.87 ** 5.84 ** 12.78 ** 3.29 10.83 **
Marginal effective tax rate 3.08 ** 4.95 ** 4.02 ** 3.92 ** 3.64 **
Average effective tax rate 8.09 ** 2.02 5.81 ** 8.15 ** 5.25 **
Micro tax rate 1.27 ** 0.60 1.08 0.14 0.61
Macro average tax rate 2.64 ** 4.31 ** 3.19 ** 3.40 ** 2.61 *
Home tax -2.24 * -2.45 * -2.24 * -0.47 -2.39 *
Average sample year 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.09 *
a Including a constant and a dummy for Belgium
b As column 1 plus dummies for unpublished (published), log(linear), OLS(other), cross section/time series (panel), stock (flow)
data, inward (outward) investment.
c As column 1 plus dummies for the studies of Swenson (2001), Slemrod, Hines, Altshuler et al., Cassou, Gorter&Parikh,
Grubert&Mutti, Boskin&Gale, and Young.
d As column 1 plus dummies if the following control variables were included: tax on domestic investors, GDP, population,
openness, agglomeration effects, unemployment, exchange rate, wages.
e As column 1 plus dummies for US, UK, Japan, France, Germany, Canada, Netherlands, Australia, Sweden, Italy, Switzerland,
Denmark, Portugal and Finland. 
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3.1). Indeed, these authors point at a number of serious problems with the earlier studies that
may cause misleading conclusions. For our meta analysis, it is nevertheless important to




































From tables 4.3 and 4.4, we observe that the semi-elasticities for exemption systems or credit
systems are neither systematically different from each other nor from unspecified systems. Only
if  we include the 20 extreme observations in the sample (second column of table 4.4) or if the
sample is restricted to significant elasticities alone (third column of table 4.4), is the semi-
elasticity in tax exemption countries higher than for tax credit countries and also higher than for
unspecified investing countries. In these cases, however, we still find an unexpected positive
coefficient for tax credit countries. 
The majority of these results is thus not consistent with the theory, that suggests that
investors from exemption countries are more responsive to taxes than are investors from tax
credit countries. The regression results also provide weaker support for the distinction between
exemption and credit countries than our ANOVA. Indeed, most of the regressions suggest no
systematic difference between the two types of systems. The explanation for this result might be
that credit systems are accompanied by exist excess foreign tax credits and tax deferral. Indeed,
as Tanzi and Bovenberg (1990) have argued, these aspects of tax credit systems render them an
effective source-based taxation of capital. This blurs the distinction between tax credit countries
and tax exemption countries.
Table 4.4 Meta regressions with different samples
base regression include extremes only significant
Retained Earnings 0.83 4.99 1.79
Transfers -0.95 -1.16 -0.82
Exempt 0.76 4.28 ** 3.15 **
Credit 0.87 1.81 1.97 **
Number of Locations -6.97 ** -4.32 * -3.59
PPE -0.43 3.09 -0.30
Plants 3.25 ** 2.71 ** 1.47
M&A -7.55 ** -8.12 ** -12.32 **
Manufacturing 0.06 -1.64 0.17
State statutory rate 7.87 ** 6.94 ** 7.43 **
Marginal effective tax rate 3.08 ** 3.89 ** 7.07 **
Average effective tax rate 8.09 ** 3.27 4.14
Micro tax rate 1.27 ** 0.46 0.27
Macro average tax rate 2.64 ** 2.98 4.91 **
Home tax -2.24 * 0.88 -2.21







































In all cases, the semi-elasticity for the number of foreign locations is smaller than that of total
foreign capital. Indeed, the coefficient is negative in our regressions and significant at the 5%
confidence level in the majority of cases. This suggests that both the number of foreign locations
and the amount of foreign capital per location are negatively correlated with the tax rate. 
Studies using data on plants yield a significantly higher semi-elasticity than others while data
on mergers and acquisitions yield a significantly smaller one. This reflects the findings by
Swenson (2001). In fact, her study is the only study in our sample that makes a distinction
between plants and mergers&acquisitions. Her results are consistent with the theory: it suggests
that investments in real capital are more responsive to host-country tax rates than are cross-
border mergers and acquisitions.
We do not find strong evidence that studies using PPE data yield higher semi-elasticities
than those using FDI. Indeed, regressions show both negative and positive signs for the PPE
dummy, but the coefficient is typically insignificant. Note from table 4.1, however, that studies
using PPE data do yield more significant results. Hence, although PPE may not have a
systematic impact on the size of elasticities, it could affect the significance. 
In contrast to our ANOVA, tables 4.3 and 4.4 suggest that manufacturing firms are not more
responsive to taxes than are other firms. Indeed, some of the regressions suggest the opposite,
i.e. that studies using only manufacturing data yield smaller elasticities than studies using all
FDI data. The effect is never significant, however. It thus does not find strong support for the
claim put forward by Altshuler et al., namely, that the Hines&Rice elasticity exceeds the
Grubert&Mutti elasticity because the first study uses all FDI data whereas the latter concentrates






















Average tax rates (based on either micro data or macro data) and effective tax rates (marginal or
average) exert a larger effect on foreign direct investment than statutory rates do. Indeed, the
coefficients for the former categories of tax rates are always positive and usually significant. 
Especially METRs yield higher semi-elasticities. Indeed, its coefficient is significant at the
5% level in all regressions. Compared to the micro and macro ATRs, it seems to perform better
in the sense that it exerts a bigger effect on the elasticities. The difference in coefficients for the
METR and the ATRs is not statistically significant, however. 
Important to note is that the AETR appears in the regression with a positive and mostly
significant coefficient. This contrasts with the findings from the ANOVA. Hence, the pairwise
comparisons tend to be misleading. In particular, the AETR is used only by the study of
Devereux&Griffith. Their relatively small semi-elasticities are not due to the AETR, but because
of other characteristics. For instance, the Devereux&Griffith study uses data on the number of
locations which exerts a negative impact on the value of the semi-elasticity. By including the 
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variation in other dimensions, the regressions in tables 4.3 and 4.4 suggest that the AETR yields










Regarding the timing, we find that studies using more recent data tend to yield higher
elasticities. Indeed, the median year of the sample period exerts a positive effect on the value of
the semi-elasticity. This is consistent with the conclusion from Altshuler et al., which suggests
that capital has become more responsive to taxes during the 1980s. Note that the coefficient for
the median year of the sample period is not significant in the majority of cases, however. 
5 Conclusions
Applying meta analysis to the tax rate elasticity of FDI has some pitfalls. First of all, the
substantial heterogeneity among studies renders a direct comparison of elasticities problematic.
For instance, it makes it difficult to specify the appropriate meta regressions that should identify
study characteristics responsible for the variation in elasticities. Secondly, some observations in
the meta sample are dependent because they originate from the same study. Indeed, a relatively
small number of studies has a disproportional impact on the meta sample because some
authors have (and others have not) decided to present a whole set of regression results. A third
pitfall refers to publication bias. In particular, a number of elasticities might not have been
reported by authors because they were either insignificant or of the unexpected sign. 
These pitfalls qualify the results from our meta analysis. However, the same limitations
apply to ordinary literature surveys as well. Moreover, compared to ordinary surveys, meta
analysis contains an important value added in making the heterogeneity among studies more
transparent, the selection process verifiable, and studies better comparable. Furthermore, the
meta regressions provide a rigorous analysis in the variation of elasticities and the structural
impact of various study characteristics. Thus, meta analysis teaches us more about the literature.
In fact, whereas regression analysis in general can be seen as a method to better understand the
underlying data, meta regressions can be seen as a method to better understand the existing
literature, which comprises the data of the meta sample.
The paper reveals a number of insights to the empirical literature on company taxation and
foreign direct investment. On average, we find that the tax rate elasticity of foreign capital is
around 3.3. There is, however, substantial variation among studies. This can be partly explained
by the underlying study characteristics. For instance, we find that studies using data on the
number of foreign locations yield systematically smaller elasticities than those using data on
foreign capital. The same holds true for data on mergers and acquisitions, as compared to
aggregate FDI data. Data on new plants and plant expansions, however, yield systematically
higher elasticities than FDI data. Studies using data on property, plant and equipment do not 
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systematically report higher or lower elasticities than studies using FDI data, although the
elasticities for the former studies are typically more often significant. 
Also the choice of the tax data seems to matter for the variation in elasticities. In particular,
studies using effective tax rates or average tax rates yield larger elasticities than studies adopting
statutory tax rates. The effective tax rates based on tax codes (marginal and average) tend to yield
relatively high elasticities as compared to average tax rates based on micro data or macro data. 
Another important finding is that the distinction between investments from tax credit
countries and tax exemption countries is irrelevant for the size of the elasticities. This is
consistent with the claim that excess foreign tax credits and tax deferral blur the distinction
between exemption systems and credit systems.
For future research, our findings suggest that controlling for the home country tax rate in
regressions matters for the value of the tax rate elasticity. Regarding the specification, we find
that studies using a linear specification find systematically larger elasticities than studies using a
log specification. Also studies using cross section data report systematically higher elasticities
than others. Finally, our meta regressions suggest that the unpublished status of a paper exerts a
positive effect on the elasticity values, as compared to the published status.
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